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INTRODUCTION

I.
V. Leo Campbell and Kathleen Campbell are the Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-respondents
in this case. This brief will hereinafter refer to them as the "Plaintiffs."
James C. Kvamme and Debra Kvamme are the Defendants/Respondents/Cross-appellants
in this case. This brief will hereinafter refer to them as the "Defendants."
IL

The APPELLANTS' BRlEF includes a statement of the case; however, contrary to the
requirements of I.AR. 35(a)(3), it does not adequately explain the "nature of the case," it does not
fairly cover the "course of proceedings in the trial or the heaiing below," and it does not contain an
accurate "statement of the facts."
Therefore, the Defendants "disagree with the statement of the case." The Defendants will
hereinafter set forth their own statement of the case in accordance with I.A.R. 35(b)(3).

III.
This case is a simple boundary dispute, involving a sliver of farm ground that is 15 feet wide.
After extensive litigation, the trial court ruled in favor of the Defendants and entered a JUDGMENT
AND DECREE OF QUIET TITLE on November 3, 2011. R. Vol. IV, p. 608.
The Plaintiffs thereafter filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION on November 15,
2011. R. Vol. IV, p. 664. According to the Plaintiffs, both before the trial court and on appeal,
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the trial court "must consider new evidence" and it is "obligated to consider such new evidence."
See APPELLANTS' BRIEF, p. 11.
Contrary to the Plaintiffs' argument, a motion for reconsideration is discretionary,
not mandatory:

The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in
the sound discretion of the trial court.
Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001).
In addition, a motion for reconsideration is not a subversive stratagem or clever
end run-that is, I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B) is not a scheme or maneuver to prolong a case, to increase the
cost of litigation, to ignore the rules of evidence, to disregard the rules of civil procedure, to violate
the rules of discovery, to snub the orders of the court, to manipulate the outcome of a motion for
summary judgment, or to engage in endless litigation. In this regard, please recall the.first rule of
civil procedure:
... These rules [including I.R. C.P. 11 (a)(2) (B)] shall be liberally construed to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.
See I.R.C.P. l(a).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiffs own a parcel of real property, located m the NEl/4 of Section 17,
Township 3 North, Range 38 East of the Boise Meridian, Bonneville County, Idaho.
2

The Defendants, too, own a parcel of real property, located in the NE1 /4 of Section 17.
Township 3 North, Range 38 East of the Boise Meridian, Bonneville County, Idaho.
The foregoing parcels of real property are contiguous-to wit, the north boundary of the
Plaintiffs' parcel ofreal property is contiguous with the south boundary of the Defendants' parcel
of real property.
The Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this case on June 30, 2010. The Plaintiffs alleged the
following:
On its northern boundary, the Subject Property abuts the Kvammes' real
property ... and the purpose of this action is to quiet title to the Subject Property in
the name of the Camp bells against any and all persons with adverse claims, interests,
encumbrances, easements, liens, or rights.
R. Vol. I, p. 12,

~

5.

The Defendants duly acknowledged that the Plaintiffs' parcel of real property "abuts" their
parcel ofreal property; however, the Defendants denied that the Plaintiffs have the rightto quiet title
to the real property that lies north of the fence that runs between their respective parcels of real
property. R. Vol. I, pp. 20-21,

~

5.

In this regard, please note that a fence runs across the middle of the NE 1/4 of Section 17.
The fence is approximately one-half mile long and runs across the entire NEl/4 of Section 17.
The Plaintiffs alleged that the fence does not sit on the boundary between the parties'
respective parcels of real property; instead, the Plaintiffs alleged that the fence sits on their parcel

of real property and is off by 15 feet. The Defendants denied that the fence sits on the Plaintiffs'
parcel of real property.
The Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on May 17, 2011. R. Vol. 1, p. 68.
The Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on June 7, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 14 3.
The cross-motions for summary judgment addressed the following three issues: The true and
correct location of the fence, the doctrine of adverse possession, and the doctrine of boundary by
agreement or acquiescence.
The foregoing three issues are separate and stand alone. They have different burdens of
proof, they have different elements of proof, and they have different facts in support thereof.
Thus, any one of the foregoing three issues is a sufficient and proper basis for the disposition
of this case, whether before the trial court or on appeal.
IL

TRUE AND CORRECT LOCATION OF THE FENCE
This issue was a watershed issue. According to the Plaintiffs, the fence does not sit on the
boundary between the parties' respective parcels of real property; instead, the Plaintiffs alleged that
the fence sits on their parcel of real property and is off by 15 feet. The Plainti(fs bore the burden
o[proo[on this issue.
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III.
KIPP L. MANWARING
In an attempt to carry their burden of proof, the Plaintiffs filed an AFFIDAVIT OF
COUNSEL of Kipp L. Manwaring, dated May 17, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 81.
In this regard, please note that Mr. Manwaring simply attached a copy of a RECORD OF
SURVEY to his affidavit. R. Vol. I, p. 116.
Mr. Manwaring is a lawyer. He is not a professional land surveyor. He is not licensed to
practice professional land surveying.
In addition, he did not prepare the RECORD OF SURVEY, he could not identify it, he could
not authenticate it, he could not lay a proper foundation for it, it was not based on his personal
knowledge, he was not competent to testify regarding it, and his arguments regarding it were
speculative, based on hearsay, and conclusory. R. Vol. II, p. 385.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
See I.R.C.P. 56(e).
Thus, the RECORD OF SURVEY was not admissible; nonetheless, the Plaintiffs persisted
and argued that the RECORD OF SURVEY "confirms that the disputed fence lies within the
Campbells' property." R. Vol. I, p. 73.
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IV.
KIM LEAVITT
The Defendants flatly disagreed with the Plaintiffs; however, rather than merely argue with
them, the Defendants filed the AFFIDAVIT OF KIM LEAVITT, dated June 7, 2011. R. Vol. II,
p. 314.

Mr. Leavitt is a professional land surveyor. He is licensed to practice professional land
surveying in the state ofidaho. R. Vol. II, p. 314,

~

2.

In addition, he has the education, knowledge, skill, experience, and training to determine the
true and correct boundaries of real property, including, without limitation, the true and correct
location of fences and other improvements thereon. R. Vol. II, p. 315, ~ 4.
Thus, Mr. Leavitt was competent to testify regarding the true and correct location of the fence
in this case. See I.R.E. 702.
The AFFIDAVIT OF KIM LEAVITT duly evidenced that the fence does not sit on the
Plaintiffs' parcel ofreal property and it is not off by 15 feet; instead, the fence sits on the boundary
between the Plaintiffs' parcel of real property and the Defendants' parcel of real property and it
marks the boundary between them.

6

Thus, the Plaintiffs did not carry their burden of proof on this issue; allegations in pleadings
and arguments of counsel are not sufficient:
... When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party
does not so respond, summary judgment ... shall be entered against him.
See I.R.C.P. 56(e).
The trial court agreed:
Pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the RECORD
OF SURVEY, submitted as an exhibit to Plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit, lacks a
proper foundation and is not properly before the court. Therefore, the Plaintiffs have
failed to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
As such, and based on the evidence properly before the court, it appears that the
fence is the boundarv line between the parcels owned bv Plaintiffs and Defendants.
R. Vol. III, p. 606 (emphasis added).

v.
THE BOTTOM LINE
The "failure" of the Plaintiffs to "set forth specific facts showing that there was a genuine
issue for trial," coupled with the "evidence properly before the court"-that is, the AFFIDAVIT OF
KIM LEA VITT-was decisive. The trial court was correct.
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VI.
NEl/4 OF SECTION 17
As previously stated, the fence runs across the middle of the NEl/4 of Section 17. It has been
there since time immemorial. R. Vol. I, p. 170, if 39, and p. 171, ~if 45-48.
According to the Plaintiffs, the fence was there "before the Davises bought the property."
R. Vol. II, p. 287 (emphasis added).
Parley Davis and Hannah Davis bought the NEl/4 of Section 17 on March 3, 1919.
R. Vol. I, p. 171, ~ 46.

Parley Davis and Hannah Davis have long since passed away. R. Vol. I, p. 166, ~ 23.

8

In 1937, Hannah Davis transferred the NEl/4 of Section 17 to Charlotte Campbell. R. Vol. I,
p. 166, ~~ 22-23.

Charlotte Campbell has also long since passed away. R. Vol. I, p. 167, ~ 25.

9

In 1950, Charlotte Campbell transferred the Nl/2 of the NEJ /4 to her daughter, Mary Killian,
and the Sl/2 of the NEl/4 to her son, Leo H. Campbell. R. Vol. I, p. 167,

~

26.

Mary Killian has also long since passed away. R. Vol. I, p. 167, rt 29.

In addition, Leo H. Campbell has also long since passed away. R. Vol. I, p. 167,
He was the father of V. Leo Campbell, the Plaintiff in this case. R. Vol. I, p. 167, rt 27.

10

~

29.

In 1981, Leo H. Campbell transferred approximately one acre of the S 1/2 of the NEI/4 to his
son, V. Leo Campbell, the Plaintiff in this case. The Plaintiffs then moved a home onto this acre and
they live there to this day, 31 years later.
In 1989, Leo H. Campbell split the Sl/2 of the NEl/4 into four parcels ofreal property. He
then transferred one parcel of real property to each of his four children-namely, the Plaintiff,
Jo Campbell, Margy Spradling, and Halene Campbell:

Leo H. Campbell transferred the foregoing parcels of real property to his children by DEED

OF GIFT, not by warranty deed. R. Vol. II, p. 236, p. 240, p. 244, and p. 248.
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In 1996, Halene Campbell passed away. Her estate split her parcel of real property into three
smaller parcels of real property. Her estate then transferred one small parcel of real property to each
of her three siblings-to wit, the Plaintiff Jo Campbell, and Margy Spradling. R. Vol. II, p. 329, ~49.

12

In 2003, the estate of Mary Killian transferred the Nl/2 of the NEl/4 to the Defendants.
R. Vol. I, p. 169,

~

35.
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VII.
REVENGE RUN AMOK
As previously stated, the Plaintiffs, Margy Spradling, and Jo Campbell own contiguous
parcels of real property in the Sl/2 of the NEl/4. R. Vol. II, pp. 328-29,

~~

47-49, and p. 376.

They collectively attempted to sell them in 2008. In this regard, Rowdy Construction made an offer
to purchase to them. R. Vol. II, pp. 273-74.
The offer to purchase was subject to two conditions: (1) Rowdy Construction "intended to
use the property as a gravel pit" and the offer to purchase was "contingent upon County approval of
the gravel pit"; and (2) The Plaintiffs agreed to survey the real property in order to exclude

"1 acre around and including [their] personal residence."
With respect to the "intended use of the property as a gravel pit," Rowdy Construction
submitted an application to the Planning and Zoning Commission of Bonneville County.

R. Vol. II, p. 274.
With respect to the "survey," the Plaintiffs retained the services of Kevin L. Thompson.

R. Vol. II, p. 286.
The Planning and Zoning Commission conducted a public hearing; however, it denied the
application. As a result, Rowdy Construction did not purchase the real properties. R. Vol. II, p. 27 4.
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The Plaintiffs blamed, and continue to blame, the Defendants for the outcome of the public
hearing-that is, the denial of the application:
... And on the morning of the mediation, we showed up at Al Stephens' office. Alan
Stephens was the mediator in this matter. And as I was pulling into the parking lot,
the Plaintiff was sitting in his car smoking. I went into the building and they came
in later. We started the mediation, and Al Stephens came in, and he was quite frankly
puzzled. He said, "The Plaintiffs really aren't focused on trying to settle this case.
They 're upset because, in their minds, [the Defendants] caused them to lose their
application to sell their property to a gravel company so the gravel company could
use it as a gravel pit." He said, "It's like a vendetta right now."
T. p. 106, LL. 11-23.
Their shot at revenge was literally right around the corner. In this regard, Mr. Thompson
finalized his survey in 2009, after the public hearing. Again, he surveyed the real properties of the
Plaintiffs, Margy Spradling, and Jo Campbell. He then prepared a RECORD OF SURVEY.
The purpose of the RECORD OF SURVEY was not to determine if the fence sits on the
boundary between the parties' respective parcels of real property; instead, the purpose of the
RECORD OF SURVEY was to illustrate the possible "combining" of six deeds-specifically, the
real properties of the Plaintiffs, Margy Spradling, and Jo Campbell:
Kevin Thompson meet with Leo Campbell and onsite on September 8, 2009.
Leo asked that Kevin combine 6 deeds as described in Instrument Numbers 924841,
1202459, 847849, 774872, and 1189866 into 3 parcels of land as shown on this
Record of Survey.
R. Vol. I, p. 116; see also, R. Vol. II, p. 316, 111, and p. 346.
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In other words, the Plaintiffs simply retained the services of Mr. Thompson to illustrate the
possible "combining of 6 deeds ... into 3 parcels of land as shown":

Parcel 1

0

Parcel 2
Parcel 3

Please note that Bonneville County, Idaho, has not approved or otherwise authorized the
"combining" of the foregoing parcels of real property. R. Vol. II, p. 330,

~

52.

In addition, the Plaintiffs, Jo Campbell, and Margy Spradling have not executed and recorded
the necessary and requisite deeds to effectuate the "combining" of the foregoing parcels of real
property. R. Vol. II, p. 330, ~ 53. As a result, the Plaintiffs do not, in fact, own Parcel 1,
notwithstanding their allegation to the contrary. R. Vol. I, p. 11, ~ 1, and p. 15.
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Nonetheless, with the RECORD OF SURVEY in hand, revenge was afoot. In this regard,
the Plaintiffs now claimed,jOr the first time ever, that the fence sits on their parcel of real property
and is off by 15 feet. In their minds, the RECORD OF SURVEY "confirmed" it. R. Vol. I, p. 73.
Suddenly, and that is not too strong of a word, the dead could speak, time warped. childhood
memories stirred, history rewrote itself into a new history, a better history, and family members.
both near and far, somehow "knew" that the fence was a "convenience fence." not the boundary.
The Plaintiffs refused to provide a copy of the RECORD OF SURVEY to the Defendants,
but that did not stop them or even deter them from filing this case to "quiet title to the Subject
Property"-that is, the 15 feet of farm ground that lies north of the fence. R. Vol. I, p. 12, ir 5.
VIII.
THE PIVOT

"Common sense," according to one comic hero, "is so rare that it's a super power." Bv all
accounts, the 15 feet of farm ground, in and of itself, is not worth the cost of litigation. But there
is more to the story.
Again, the Defendants purchased the Nl/2 of the NEl/4 in 2003. R. Vol. I, p. 169,

~

35.

They farm it. R. Vol. I, p. 172, ii 54.
Shortly thereafter, the Defendants rented the Sl/2 of the NEI/4 from the Plaintiffs. Margy
Spradling, and Jo Campbell. R. Vol. II, p. 284. They farmed it until 2008-specifically, until the
Plaintiffs, Margy Spradling, and Jo Campbell "had an opportunity to sell the land." Again, Rowdy
Construction made an offer to purchase to them in 2008. R. Vol. II, pp. 273-74.
17

Be(ore Rowdy Construction made the offer to purchase, however, the Defendants installed
a center irrigation pivot on the Nl/2 of the NEl/4. R. Vol. I, p. 175, ~ 63. The pivot sits on the north
side of the fence. It includes a pump, an underground mainline, a riser, and a concrete anchor pad.

R. Vol. I, p. 174, and Vol. II, pp. 257-64.
The pivot was designed and engineered to cover both the N 1/2 of the NE 1/4 and the S 1
of the NEl/4. Again, the Defendants were farming both halves at the time. R. Vol. II, p. 284. and
p. 391.

The Plaintiffs knew about the pivot from the get-go, including its location-that is, on the
north side of the fence. The Plaintiffs and the Defendants discussed the location of the pump. which
is close to the Plaintiffs' house, the possibility of noise, the placement of panels in the Plaintiffs'
fences, which enable the pivot to rotate through the Sl/2 of the NEl/4, and the placement of
backstops on the Plaintiffs' real property.

Q.

With reference to Mr. Kvamrne's use and occupancy since 2003, you
likewise admit that it has been open and plainly visible, correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And that, again, would include all of the ground north of the fence?

A.

Correct.

Q.

In fact, he has installed a pivot, pump, and motor on that ground north
of the fence, hasn't he?

A.

Yes, he has.

Q.

And, again, that was plainly and openly visible?
18

A.

Yup.

Q.

And you had knowledge of it and you've known about his open use
since 2003?

A.

Yes.

R. Vol. I, pp. 179-80, and Vol. II, p. 283.
The installation of the pivot took weeks and the Plaintiffs watched it, literally from the
comfort of their own home: nonetheless, the Plaintiffs never said a word to the Defendants about the
fence, whether it sits on their parcel of real property, or whether it is off by 15 feet:
Q.

Do you allege or claim that you ever told Mr. Kvamme that you
claimed an interest in the land north of the fence?

A.

I attempted to.

Q.

Do you allege or claim that you ever told Mr. Kvamme that you claim
an interest in the land north of the fence, yes or no.

A.

No.

R. Vol. I, p. 181, and Vol. II, p. 284.

IX.
TURNING THE CARDS FACE UP
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the RECORD OF SURVEY marked the dawn of anevv day.
the chance for revenge. Again, Mr. Thompson finalized it in 2009. Just before the Plaintiffs filed
the complaint in this case, they disclosed their dark, but true motive in a letter to the Defendants,
dated May 27, 2010:

19

... Further, in the event such personal property [i.e. pump, anchor pad, and mainline]
is determined to be a fixture, it remains as part of the real property and title to all
such property is quieted in the names of the owners of the real property.
R. Vol. II, p. 391.
In short, the Plaintiffs' goal in this case is to take the Defendants' pivot, if not in whole, then
at least in part-that is, the "pump, anchor pad, and mainline." Again, the pivot was designed and
engineered to irrigate both halves of the NEI/4, including their half.

x.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
As previously stated, the Plaintiffs refused to provide a copy of the RECORD OF SURVEY
to the Defendants; nonetheless, the Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this case on June 30, 2010.
On September 6, 2010, the Defendants served interrogatories and requests for production on
the Plaintiffs. R. Vol. I, p. 34.
The interrogatories and requests for production were straightforward. For example. the
interrogatories specifically and expressly asked the Plaintiffs to disclose the following information
in accordance with I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4):
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please state the name, address, and telephone
number of each and every expert "expected to testify" in this case, whether "acquired
or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial." See I.R.C.P. 26(b )( 4).
INTERROGATORYN0.2: InconnectionwithINTERROGATORYNO. l,
above, please provide a full and complete "statement of all opinions to be expressed
and the basis and reasons therefor." See I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(I).

20

INTERROGATORYNO. 3: lnconnectionwithINTERROGATORYNO. l.
above, please provide a full and complete statement of "any qualifications of the
witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness within the
preceding ten years." See I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(I).
INTERROGATORYNO. 4: In connection withINTERROGATORYNO. L
above, please provide a full and complete disclosure of "the compensation to be paid
forthe testimony." See I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(I).
INTERROGATORYNO. 5: In connection with INTERROGATORY NO. L
above, please provide a full and complete "listing of any other cases ,in which the
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four
years." See I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
R. Vol. IV, pp. 704-05.

In addition, the requests for production specifically and expressly asked the Plaintiffs to
disclose the following documents:
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Please produce the resume of each
and every expert "expected to testify" in this case, whether "acquired or developed
in anticipation of litigation or for trial." See I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4).
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Please produce the curriculum vitae
of each and every expert "expected to testify" in this case, whether "acquired or
developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial." See I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4).
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please produce the report of each
and every expert "expected to testify" in this case, whether "acquired or developed
in anticipation of litigation or for trial." See I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4).
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please produce the entire file of
each and every expert "expected to testify" in this case, whether "acquired or
developed in anticipation oflitigation or for trial," including, without limitation, any
and all correspondence, notes, records, and other documents. See I.R.C.P. 26(b )( 4).
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: In connection with REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION NOS. 1 through4, above, please produce any and all "data and
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other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions." See I.R.C.P.
26(b )( 4)(A)(I).
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: In connection with REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION NOS. 1 through4, above, please produce any and all "exhibits
to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions." See I.R.C.P. 26(b )(4)(A)(i).
R. Vol. IV, p. 711.
On September 30, 2010, the Plaintiffs answered the interrogatories and responded to the
requests for production and they did so under oath. R. Vol. IV, p. 733. However, notwithstanding
their knowledge of Mr. Thompson and the key importance of the RECORD OF SURVEY in this
case, the Plaintiffs did not answer and respond to the foregoing interrogatories and requests for
production regarding expert witnesses. "None" was their sole, repeated response. R. Vol. IV,
pp. 719-20 and 725-26.
As before, the Plaintiffs did not produce or otherwise provide a copy of the RECORD OF
SURVEY to the Defendants:
... [A]n evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
See I.R.C.P. 37(a)(3).
The litigation continued. Of course, the Plaintiffs were then under a duty to supplement their
answers and responses:
A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was
complete when made is under to duty to supplement his response to include
information thereafter acquired, except as follows:
(1)
A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his
response with respect to any question directly addressed to:
22

(B)
The identity of each person expected to
be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject
matter on which he is expected to testify, and the
substance of his testimony.
See I.R.C.P. 26(e)(l)(B).
On October 11, 2010, the trial court conducted a status conference in this case. The court
set this case for trial on April 25, 2011, and duly entered an ORDER SETTING PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE AND JURY TRIAL. R. Vol. I, p. 40.
On November 23, 2010, the Plaintiffs supplemented their answers and responses, but not
with respect to the interrogatories and requests for production regarding expert witnesses; in other
words, their supplemental answers and responses related to other interrogatories and otlier requests
for production. R. Vol. I, p. 50.
On December 14, 2010, the Plaintiffs,jOr the second time, supplemented their answers and
responses, but not with respect to the interrogatories and requests for production regarding expert
witnesses; in other words, their supplemental answers and responses related to other interrogatories
and other requests for production. R. Vol. I, p. 59.
In the ORDER SETTING PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND JURY TRIAL, above, the trial
court ordered the parties to disclose their respective expert witnesses 90 days before trial-that is. on
or before January 25, 2011:

'Y'
--'

No later than 90 days before the date set for trial, counsel shall disclose the names,
addresses, and telephone numbers of expert witnesses that may be called to testify at
trial.
R. Vol. I, p. 40, Section I, Paragraph 2.
In accordance with the trial court's order, the Defendants duly filed a DISCLOSURE OF
EXPERT WITNESSES on January 25, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 63. In this regard, please note that the
Defendants duly disclosed their expert witness, Mr. Leavitt.

R. Vol. I, p. 64.

Howevec

notwithstanding their knowledge of Mr. Thompson and the importance of the RECORD OF
SURVEY in this case, the Plaintiffs did not file a DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESSES.
In addition, in the ORDER SETTING PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND JURY TRIAL
the trial court also ordered the parties to "complete" their discovery "70 days before trial." R. Vol. l,
p. 40, Section I, Paragraph 4.
In accordance with the trial court's order, the Defendants duly served a finaL supplemental
interrogatory and a final, supplemental request for production on the Plaintiffs:
A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the court,
agreement of the parties, or at anv time prior to trial through new requests for
supplementation of prior responses.
See I.R.C.P. 26(e)(3) (emphasis added).
The supplemental interrogatory and the supplemental request for production were
straightforward:
INTERROGATORYNO. 19: If applicable, please supplement your answers
to INTERROGATORYNOS. 1through18, dated September 30, 2010, in accordance
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with l.R.C.P. 26(e)(3). In this regard, please make sure that your answers are not
"evasive or incomplete" in violation of I.R.C.P. 37(a)(3).
R. Vol. IV, p. 755.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 28: If applicable, please supplement
your responses to REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NOS. 1 through 27, dated
September 30, 2010, in accordance with I.R.C.P. 26(e)(3). In this regard, please
make sure that your answers are not "evasive or incomplete" in violation of I.R.C.P.
37(a)(3).
R. Vol. IV, p. 759.
On January 24, 2011, the Plaintiffs answered the supplemental interrogatory and responded
to the supplemental request for production. R. Vol. I, p. 62. However, notwithstanding their
knowledge of Mr. Thompson and the importance of the RECORD OF SURVEY in this case, the
Plaintiffs,.fOr the third time, did not supplement their answers and responses with respect to the
interrogatories and requests for production regarding expert witnesses.
At that point, the Defendants were ready for trial; however, on the eve of trial, the Plaintiffs
filed a MOTION TO CONTINUE. According to the Plaintiffs, the "added stress of trial could he
fatal to Mr. Campbell." R. Vol. I, p. 65. The court granted the mo ti on and moved the trial from
April 25, 2011, to March 5, 2012.
Immediately thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on May 17, 2011.
R. Vol. I, p. 68. However, notwithstanding their knowledge of Mr. Thompson and the importance
of the RECORD OF SURVEY in this case, the Plaintiffs did not file an affidavit from
Mr. Thompson in support of their motion for summary judgment; instead, they filed the AFFIDAVIT

25

OF COlJNSEL of Kipp L. Manwaring. As previously stated, Mr. Manwaring simply attached a copy
of the RECORD OF SURVEY to his affidavit.
Again, Mr. Manwaring is a lawyer. He was not an expert witness in this case. He did not
prepare the RECORD OF SURVEY, he could not identify it, he could not authenticate it, he could

not lay a proper foundation for it, it was not based on his personal knowledge, he was not competent
to testify regarding it, and his arguments regarding it were speculative, based on hearsay, and
conclusory. In short, the RECORD OF SURVEY was not admissible.
As a result, the Defendants filed an OBJECTION TO RECORD OF SURVEY on June 21.
2011, and duly moved the court to strike the AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL and the RECORD OF
SURVEY in accordance with I.R.C.P. 56( e), I.R.E. 701, I.R.E. 702, I.R.E. 901, and I.R.E. 103(a)(l ).
R. Vol. II, p. 385.
In addition, the Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, including an
affidavit in support thereof from their expert witness, Mr. Leavitt. R. Vol. I, p. 143. However.
notwithstanding their knowledge of Mr. Thompson and the importance of the RECORD OF
SURVEY in this case, the Plaintiffs did not file an affidavit from Mr. Thompson in opposition to
the Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment; moreover. they did not file a motion for a
"continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained" or to cure or otherwise remedy the foregoing
evidentiary issues in accordance with I.R.C.P. 56(f); instead, they simply forged ahead with full
knowledge of the foregoing evidentiary issues and full knowledge of the requirement upon them to
survive the cross-motions for summary judgment:
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Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence. and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein ....
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party
does not so respond, summary judgment ... shall be entered against him.
See I.R.C.P. 56(e).
The hearing of the cross-motions for summary judgment was set for July 5, 2011. Just before
the hearing, the Plaintiffs filed a MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME. The Plaintiffs moved the
trial court for an extension of time "to respond to the Kvammes' motion for summary judgment."
R. Vol. II, p. 383. The trial court granted the motion and moved the hearing of the cross-motions
for summary judgment from July 5, 2011, to September 12, 2011. R. Vol. III, p. 473.
The Plaintiffs then deposed Mr. Leavitt on July 27, 2011, well in advance of the hearing. The
Plaintiffs thereafter filed a memorandum in opposition to the Defendants' cross-motion for summary
judgment on August 26. 2011. R. Vol. IIL p. 474. However, notwithstanding their knowledge of
Mr. Thompson and the importance of the RECORD OF SURVEY in this case, the Plaintiffs still did
not file an affidavit from Mr. Thompson in support of their motion for summary judgment. they
still did not file an affidavit from Mr. Thompson in opposition to the Defendants' cross-motion for
summary judgment and they still did not file a motion for a "continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained" or to cure or otherwise remedy the foregoing evidentiary issues in accordance with
I.R.C.P. 56(f).
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Instead, the Plaintiffs filed a second AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL of Kipp L. Manwaring.
R. Vol. III, p. 4 78. Once again, the Plaintiffs forged ahead with full knowledge of the foregoing
evidentiary issues and full knowledge of the requirement upon them to survive the cross-motions for
summary judgment.
The Defendants thereafter filed a reply memorandum to the cross-motions for summary
judgment. R. Vol. III, p. 489. In addition, the Defendants filed a reply affidavit from Mr. Leavitt.
In it, he carefully addressed and disposed ofMr. Manwaring's arguments. R. Vol. III, pp. 500-10.
Again, allegations in pleadings and arguments of counsel are not sufficient.
At the hearing, the trial court truly "interrogated counsel" in accordance with I.R. C.P. 56( d).
T. pp. 5-69. During the colloquy, the trial court alerted or otherwise forewarned the Plaintiffs about
the foregoing evidentiary issues:
Mr. Seamons: So my answer to that, your Honor, is: If we do not follO\v what
Mr. Leavitt has done-and, again, I want to emphasize he has followed
the law.
He has followed the Manual of Surveying. He has
performed his professional services in accordance with it. He has laid
that out without dispute from them. There is no counter-affidavit
here that says Mr. Leavitt didn't do this correctly, he didn't make the
measurements, he didn't take the history correctly.
My point is this: If we throw Mr. Leavitt's [opinion] out the door,
what do you have in front of you to say that's not the boundary?
Their burden in this case is to show that there is a dispute here about
a boundary, and that this piece of property is not where it is supposed
to be. What do you have? Nothing.

28

Mr. Seamons

Is this conversation any different for the survey that \Vas
stapled to Kipp's affidavit?

Court:

Oh no. I have questions about the survey that was stapled to
Kipp's affidavit.

T. p. 46, LL. 6-25, p. 47, L. 1, and p. 51, LL. 12-16.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court allowed both parties to "augment" or otherwise
supplement the record. The Plaintiffs augmented the record on September 23, 2011. However.
notwithstanding their knowledge of Mr. Thompson and the importance of the RECORD OF
SURVEY in this case, the Plaintiffs still did not file an affidavit from Mr. Thompson in support of
their motion for summary judgment, they still did not file an affidavit from Mr. Thompson in
opposition to the Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment, and they still did not file a
motion for a "continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained" or to cure or otherwise remedy the
foregoing evidentiary issues in accordance with I.R.C.P. 56(f).
Instead, the Plaintiffs filed an "augmented memorandum" and a third affidavit of counsel of
Kipp L. Manwaring-to wit, the AUGMENTED AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF
CAMPBELLS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. R. Vol. III, p. 557. Once again, the
Plaintiffs forged ahead with full knowledge of the foregoing evidentiary issues and full knowledge
of the requirement upon them to survive the cross-motions for summary judgment.
As before, Mr. Manwaring attached a copy of the RECORD OF SURVEY to his augmented
affidavit. R. Vol. III, p. 567. In addition, he attached five pages from the Manual of Surveying to
his augmented affidavit. R. Vol. III, pp. 560-64.
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As a result, the Defendants filed an objection to the augmented affidavit of Mr. Manwaring
and duly moved the court to strike it in accordance with I.R.C.P. 56(e), I.R.E. 70L l.R.E. 702,
I.R.E. 901, and I.R.E. 103(a)(l). R. Vol. III, p. 568.
In addition, the Defendants filed an objection to the augmented memorandum and duly
moved the court to strike it. R. Vol. III, p. 592.
Finally, the Defendants also augmented the record. In this regard, the Defendants filed an
augmented affidavit from Mr. Leavitt. R. Vol. III, p. 572. In it, he once again addressed and
disposed of Mr. Manwaring's arguments. R. Vol. III, p. 572.
Those three documents-specifically, ( 1) the objection to the augmented affidavit of
Mr. Manwaring, (2) the objection to the augmented memorandum, and (3) the augmented affidavit

of Mr. Leavitt-are must-read documents for the proper disposition of this case on appeal.
The Plaintiffs did not thereaner file an affidavit from Mr. Thompson in support of their
motion for summary judgment, they did not thereafter file an affidavit from Mr. Thompson in
opposition to the Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment, and they did not thereafter file
a motion for a "continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained" or to cure or otherwise remedy the
foregoing evidentiary issues in accordance with I.R.C.P. 56(f). Once again, the Plaintiffs forged
ahead with full knowledge of the foregoing evidentiary issues and full knowledge of the requirement
upon them to survive the cross-motions for summary judgment.
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XI.
OPINION AND ORDER
The record was now complete. One month later, the trial court entered its OPINION AND
ORDER on October 28, 2011. The trial court cut straight to the chase:
Pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the RECORD
OF SURVEY, submitted as an exhibit to Plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit lacks a
proper foundation and is not properly before the comi. Therefore, the Plaintiffs have
failed to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." As
such, and based on the evidence properly before the court, it appears that the fence
is the boundary line between the parcels owned by Plaintiffs and Defendants.
R. Vol. III, p. 606 (emphasis added).

XII.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
The Plaintiffs lost. They did not carry their burden of proof. Therefore, the trial court ruled
in favor of the Defendants and entered a JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF QUIET TITLE on
November 3, 2011. R. Vol. IV, p. 608.
Twelve days later, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to
I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B). R. Vol. IV, p. 664.
Amazingly, after months of exhaustive briefing, a lengthy continuance, an intervening
deposition, grueling oral argument, and a full and free opportunity to augment or otherwise
supplement the record, the Plaintiffs finally,jina/lv, filed an affidavit from Mr. Thompson, dated
November 15, 2011. R. Vol. IV, p. 667.
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After having failed to answer and respond to the foregoing interrogatories and requests for

production regarding expert witnesses, after having failed to disclose Mr. Thompson in accordance
with the court's ORDER SETTING PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND JURY TRIAL, after having
failed to supplement their answers and responses in accordance with I.R.C.P. 26(e)(l)(B), after
having failed to supplement their answers and responses in accordance with I.R.C.P. 26(e)(3), after
having failed to file an affidavit from Mr. Thompson in support of their motion for summary
judgment, after having failed to file an affidavit from Mr. Thompson in opposition to the
Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment, after having failed to file a motion for a
"continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained," after having knowingly forged ahead with full
knowledge of the foregoing evidentiary issues and the requirement upon them to survive the
cross-motions for summary judgment, and after having lost, the Plaintiffs now wanted the trial court
to let them take a mulligan, to go back to square one, to have a do-over.
That is not fair, that is not right, and that is not the law.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the district court abuse its discretion in disregarding the affidavit of Kevin
Thompson and denying the Campbells' motion for reconsideration?
See APPELLANTS' BRIEF, p. 9.
ARGUMENT
First, the trial court did not "disregard" Mr. Thompson's affidavit. Second, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion.

The following case is dispositive of the issue herein. The procedural history is very similar,
if not the same, and the ruling of the Idaho Supreme Court is right on point:
... The court found that plaintiffs had failed to disclose Bidstrup as an expert witness
in violation of the court's scheduling order.

... Even after the defendants filed motions for summary judgment. arguing that
Bidstrup had not been disclosed as an expert witness, and filed motions to strike
Bidstrup's second affidavit for lack of qualification and improper rendering of
opinions on questions of law, appellants made no effort to remedy the situation.
Citing I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4), the district court did not allow Bidstrup's testimony in the
form of his second affidavit.
The district court's decision striking Bidstrup's second affidavit is affirmed .
. . . The appellants had ample notice of the hearing and knew what was required of
them to survive the summary judgment motions. Appellants did not establish that
a genuine issue of material fact existed. The grants of summary judgment are
affirmed.

"The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration
generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial court." Jordan v.
Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion
for reconsideration. The court exercised reason in reaching its decision that the
appellants had been given numerous opportunities to prepare their case. They were
aware of the defendants' motions for summary judgment and motions to strike
Bidstrup's second affidavit. They made no effort to request an extension of time
before the hearing, nor did they address or correct the deficiencies in the affidavit.
Instead, after the court issued its order, they requested a time extension to submit
additional affidavits or retain another expert. The court found that the appellants had
been given several opportunities to remedy the issues raised by the defendants in
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their motions. Based on the record before the district court, it did not abuse its
discretion in denying appellants' motion for reconsideration.
Camell v. Barker Management. Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 48 P.3d 651 (2002).

THE SPIN ZONE
According to the Plaintiffs, the trial court "applied the wrong legal standard" to their motion
for reconsideration:
Consequently, the district court incorrectly focused on the newly discovered
evidence standard ofl.R.C.P. 60(b)(2) and the timing requirement ofl.R.C.P. 56(c).
The district court glossed over I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B) by merely treating that rule as
pertaining to an exclusively limited set of circumstances.
Instead of properly considering Rule 11 (a)(2)(B), the district court narrowed
its scope of reconsideration to newly discovered evidence that fell outside the strict
time limitations for summary judgment. Indeed, the district comi opined that, if
additional evidence could be presented in a motion for reconsideration, then
summary judgments would never achieve finality.
Thus, the district court not only applied the wrong legal standard, but it also
reached an incorrect conclusion on the purpose and effect of motions for
reconsideration.
See APPELLANTS' BRIEF, p. 13.
Hogwash. If we do not get anything else right on this appeal, let's at least get this right:
Judge Shindurling is a veteran judge; he is the Administrative Judge of the Seventh Judicial District;
he is likely the most senior District Judge in the state of Idaho; he knows his way around the
courtroom and he does not bump into the furniture.
In order to spin their argument, the Plaintiffs carefully excised and quoted one paragraph
from the transcript of the oral argument: One!
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The following five points are dispositive:
1.

The transcript of the oral argument is 28 pages long. T. pp. 70-98. Please read it.

No one, including Judge Shindurling, was confused about the standard. As previously stated.
a motion for reconsideration is discretionary, not mandatory:
The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in
the sound discretion of the trial court.
Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001).
2.

The paragraph, \vhich the Plaintiffs so carefully excised and quoted, was actually a

question to Mr. Manwaring, who had just stated the following:
Mr. Manwaring:

And it is an abuse of discretion not to consider new evidence
that changes the judgment and reconsider that judgment in
light of that evidence. So we would ask the court to grant the
motion.

The Court:

So, Mr. Manwaring, what authority do you have that it's an
abuse of discretion not to consider new evidence when it
doesn't comply with 60(b )(2)?

T. p. 89, LL. 11-18 (emphasis added).
In response, Mr. Manwaring confessed and ultimately admitted that Mr. Thompson's
affidavit was not "new evidence"; instead, it was a belated attempt to cure the foregoing evidentiary
issues, the very foundational issues that the Plaintiffs had so steadfastly chosen to ignore:
We're not telling the court, by the way, we have a brand new survey that
changes everything. It's the same Record of Survey. It's the same item of evidence
relied upon by both parties, but the foundation issue that the court addressed as it
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relates to the Affidavit of Counsel is now satisfied by the affidavit of Kevin
Thompson. I think that is appropriate in a motion to reconsider.
T. p. 92, LL. 11-18 (emphasis added).
3.

The fact that Judge Shindurling and Mr. Manwaring discussed I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2) at

oral argument is, quite frankly, a red hening: They are both subject to the same standard-that is,
both I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B) and I.R.C.P. 60(b )(2) are discretionary, not mandatory.
4.

More importantly, the fact that Judge Shindurling and Mr. Manwaring discussed

I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2) at oral argument is not relevant.

Judge Shindurling took the motion for

reconsideration under advisement. T. p. 98, LL. 8-10. He thereafter entered an OPINJ ON AND
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONFORRECONSIDERATION. R. Vol. IV,p. 771. Of course,
the OPINION AND ORDER is the key, not oral argument.
In other words, Judge Shindurling and Mr. Manwaring could have discussed anything at oral
argument, ranging from I.R.C.P. 60(b )(2) to religion to politics to the law of gravity. Oral argument
is oral argument; nothing more, nothing less.
The OPINION AND ORDER, however, is different. It is relevant. In it, Judge Shindurling
recited the history of the case, he set forth the standard of review, he explained his analysis, and he
made a decision:
In its October 28, 2011, Opinion and Order, this court found that, "[p ]ursuant
to Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Record of Survey submitted
as an exhibit to Plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit lacks a proper foundation and is not
properly before the court." Although Plaintiffs request this court to reconsider its
opinion in light of the new evidence supplied with their motion, there is no new
evidence with their motion. The evidence is the same Record of Survey performed
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by Kevin Thompson that was not properly before the court in the previous motions.
The Plaintiffs have now submitted an Affidavit of Kevin Thompson to lay the proper
foundation for the survey, but the evidence is not new. While Plaintiffs are not
required to present new evidence in a Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) motion for reconsideration,
their motion is based on the court now considering the Record of Survey that was not
properly before the court on the previous motions. This evidence was known to the
Plaintiffs in May of2011 when they filed for summary judgment and was known to
them when the complaint was filed in this case in June of 2010. Based on Rule 56( c)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and also on the court's Scheduling Order, the
affidavit of Kevin Thompson should have been submitted months ago. Therefore,
as the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests in this court's
discretion, this court finds that it is too late to now submit an affidavit that could
have, and should have, been submitted months ago. To decide otherwise would
essentially allow Plaintiffs to not comply with the rules of civil procedure and the
court's Scheduling Order and roll the dice with a motion for summary judgment. If
they lose on that motion, under the same rules of civil procedure not complied with
originally, they would then be allowed to file endless restructured motions on the
same subject matter.
R. Vol. IV, pp. 772-73.
Judge Shindurling denied the motion. He "correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion,.,
he "acted within the outer boundaries of [his] discretion," and he "reached a decision by an exercise
of reason." Carnell v. Barker Management Inc., 137 Idaho at 329, 48 P.3d at 659 (emphasis added).
Equally important, Judge Shindurling did not apply I.R.C.P. 60(b )(2), he did not use it, and
he did not rely on it. In fact, from top to bottom and from front to back, his OPINION AND ORDER
does not cite it, refer to it, or even include the words I.R.C.P. 60(b )(2).
5.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Mr. Manwaring knew better. He is a seasoned

litigator; he has been practicing law since 1988; he is a member of the National Order of Barristers
and American Inns of Court; he is past member and President of the Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys
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Association; he is a past elected Bonneville County Prosecuting Attorney from 1996 to 2001: and
he is a member of the Idaho Supreme Court Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee:
Mr. Seamons: Your Honor, [the Plaintiffs'] motion for summary judgment was only
supported by a single affidavit from Mr. Manwaring. And everybody
in this courtroom would have to agree that I have made a strenuous
and repeated effort to state these two concepts throughout this battle
on motions for summary judgment:
Number one: They have not presented admissible evidence to you.
Mr. Marwaring's affidavit does not do that. He is an attorney. He is
not an expert witness, and that is not the proper way to present that
kind of evidence.
Number two: I repeatedly emphasized that they have a burden of
proof in this case, and that burden of proof is upon them to show the
court that there is a boundary in dispute, and here is where they claim
is the correct boundary. They've got a burden to meet here.

Notwithstanding these cross-motions for summary judgment, your
Honor, they forged ahead knowing that they did not have proper
evidence before the court and that their burden of proof was now
directly in jeopardy.
Your Honor, I want to stress [that] I am not dealing in this case \Vith
prose litigants. And I realize that even prose litigants are supposed
to follow the same rules and obey the same procedures, but we all
know that we give them the benefit of the doubt when they are
novices, when they're pro se litigants. I'm dealing here with a
seasoned attorney. I am dealing here with evidentiary issues that
were taught to us in law school in Evidence 101. I am dealing here
with expert witness testimony that could have been and should have
been provided to me in 2009, that was systematically not produced,
that was systematically not supplemented, that was systematically not
given to me or the court until after they fight and lose the crossmotions for summary judgment.
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If they had simply filed that singular affidavit back on May 1T 11 ,
I could have avoided mountains of briefing, mountains of motions,
motions to strike affidavits of counsel. Your Honor, my clients could
have saved literally thousands of dollars if they had just done this the
way Rule 56( e) requires them to do it, but they didn't. So, ifthe court
is going to entertain their motion to reconsider, under Rule 56, we
would ask the court to require them to reimburse us for those costs
and fees. And that seems not only fair, but logical.
T. p. 78, LL 9-25, p. 79, LL. 7-25, p. 80, L. 1, p. 84, LL. 22-25, and p. 85, LL 1-8.

COSTS ON APPEAL
The Defendants hereby claim costs on appeal in accordance with I.A.R. 40(a).

ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
The Defendants hereby claim attorney's fees on appeal in accordance with I.A.R. 35(b)(5).
I.A.R. 41 (a), I.A.R. 11.2. and Idaho Code Section 12-121. The trial court did not "apply the wrong
legal standard" to the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
The Plaintiffs' argument, based on one paragraph from oral argument, that the trial court
"incorrectly" applied I.R.C.P. 60(b )(2) and "glossed over" I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B) is spin. It is also
frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.
Again, the trial comi did not apply I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2), it did not use it, and it did not rely on
it. Again, from top to bottom and from front to back, the OPINION AND ORDER does not cite it.
refer to it, or even include the words I.R.C.P. 60(b )(2).
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CONCLUSION
The trial court duly and properly denied the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
It "correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion," it "acted within the outer boundaries of its

discretion," and it "reached a decision by an exercise ofreason." Carnell v. Barker Management.
Inc., 137 Idaho at 329, 48 P.3d at 659. The end.
However, if this court reverses the trial court, the Plaintiffs, in all fairness, need to reimburse
the Defendants for the reasonable costs and attorney's fees that they incurred as a result of the
Plaintiffs' course of action. R. Vol. IV, pp. 698-701.
Again, the Plaintiffs did not answer and respond to the foregoing interrogatories and requests
for production regarding expert witnesses in accordance with I.R.C.P. 26(b )( 4 ); they did not disclose
Mr. Thompson in accordance with the court's ORDER SETTING PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
AND JURY TRIAL; they did not supplement their answers and responses in accordance with
I.R.C.P. 26(e)(l)(B); they did not supplement their answers and responses in accordance with
I.R.C.P. 26(e)(3); they did not file an affidavit from Mr. Thompson in support of their motion for
summary judgment in accordance with I.R.C.P. 56(e); they did not to file an affidavit from
Mr. Thompson in opposition to the Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment in accordance
with I.R.C.P. 56(e); they did not file a motion for a "continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained"
or to cure or otherwise remedy the foregoing evidentiary issues in accordance with I.R.C.P. 56(f}
instead, they simply forged ahead with full knowledge of the foregoing evidentiary issues and the
requirement upon them to survive the cross-motions for summary judgment.
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Thus, if this court reverses the trial court, this court should direct or otherwise order the trial
court to award reasonable costs and attorney's fees to the Defendants. R. Vol. IV, pp. 698-701;
see also, Vol. III, p. 612 and Vol. IV, p. 638. The following statute and rules of civil procedure
provide a basis therefor.
1.

Idaho Code Section 1-1603:
Every court has power:

(2)

(3)
officers.
(4)

To enforce order in the proceedings before it ....
To provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its

To compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process ....

(8)
To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice.
2.

I.R.C.P. l(a):

... These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.
3.

I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(l):

... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or
party has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that, to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted bv existing law ... and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. . .. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed
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in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
4.

I.R.C.P. 26(e)(4):

If a party fails to seasonably supplement the responses as required in this Rule
26( e), the trial court may exclude the testimony of witnesses or the admission of
evidence not disclosed by a required supplementation of the responses of the party.

5.

I.R.C.P. 37(e):

In addition to the sanctions above under this rule for violation of discovery
procedures, any court may in its discretion impose sanctions or conditions, as assess
attorney's fees, costs, or expenses against a party or the party's attorney for failure
to obey an order of the court made pursuant to these rules.

6.

I.R.C.P. 56(c):

... The comi may alter ... the time periods and requirements of this rule for good
cause shown, may continue the hearing, and may impose costs, attorney's fees, and
sanctions against a party or his attorney, or both.
7.

I.R.C.P. 56(g):

Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the
affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to
the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the
affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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Dated October 24, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I served a copy of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF on the following people on
October 24, 2012:
Just Law Office
Attn: Charles C. Just and Kipp L. Manwaring
3 81 Shoup A venue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
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INTRODUCTION
V. Leo Campbell and Kathleen Campbell are the Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-respondents
in this case. This brief will hereinafter refer to them as the "Plaintiffs."
James C. Kvamme and Debra Kvamme are the Defendants/Respondents/Cross-appellants
in this case. This brief will hereinafter refer to them as the "Defendants."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiffs own a parcel of real property, located

111

the NE 1/4 of Section 17,

Township 3 North, Range 38 East of the Boise Meridian, Bonneville County, Idaho.
The Defendants also own a parcel of real property, located in the NEl/4 of Section 17,
Township 3 North, Range 38 East of the Boise Meridian, B01meville County, Idaho.
The foregoing parcels of real property are contiguous-to wit, the north boundary of the
Plaintiffs' parcel is contiguous with the south boundary of the Defendants' parcel.
The Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this case on June 30, 2010. The Plaintiffs alleged the
following:
On its northern boundary, the Subject Property abuts the Kvammes' real
property ... and the purpose of this action is to quiet title to the Subject Property in
the name of the Camp bells against any and all persons with adverse claims, interests,
encumbrances, easements, liens, or rights.

R. Vol. I, p. 12,, 5.

The Defendants duly acknowledged that the Plaintiffs' parcel of real property "abuts" their
parcel of real property; however, the Defendants denied that the Plaintiffs have the right to quiet title
to the real property that lies north of the fence that runs between their respective parcels of real
property. R. Vol. I, pp. 20-21,

~

5.

In this regard, please note that a fence runs across the middle of the NEl/4 of Section 17.
The fence is approximately one-half mile long and runs across the entire NEl/4 of Section 17.
According to the Plaintiffs, the fence does not sit on the boundary between the parties'
respective parcels of real property; instead, it sits on their parcel of real property and is off by 15 feet.
In other words, this case is a simple boundary dispute, involving a sliver of farm ground that
is 15 feet wide.
The Defendants filed an answer and counterclaim on July 27, 2010. The Defendants alleged
that they own the real property that lies north of the fence, based on the doctrines of adverse
possession and/or boundary by agreement or acquiescence. R. Vol. I, p. 26,

~

(f) and p. 27,

~

(h).

The Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on May 17, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 68.
The Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on June 7, 2011. R. Vol. L p. 143.
The cross-motions for summary judgment addressed the following three issues:
1.

The true and correct location of the fence;

2.

The doctrine of adverse possession;

3.

The doctrine of boundary by agreement or acquiescence.

2

The foregoing three issues are separate and stand alone. They have different burdens of
proof, they have different elements of proof, and they have different facts in support thereof.
Thus, any one of the foregoing three issues is a sufficient and proper basis for the disposition
of this case, whether before the trial court or on appeal.
II.

TRUE AND CORRECT LOCATION OF THE FENCE
As previously stated, according to the Plaintiffs, the fence does not sit on the boundary
between the parties' respective parcels of real property; instead, it sits on their parcel of real property
and is off by 15 feet. The Plaintiffs bore the burden of proof on this issue.
In an attempt to carry their burden of proof, the Plaintiffs filed an AFFIDAVIT OF
COUNSEL of Kipp L. Manwaring, dated May 17, 2011.

In this regard, please note that

Mr. Manwaring simply attached a copy of a RECORD OF SURVEY to his affidavit. R. Vol. I.

p. 116.
Mr. Manwaring is a la\vyer. He is not a professional land surveyor. Moreover, he did not
prepare the RECORD OF SURVEY, he could not identify it, he could not authenticate it, he could
not lay a proper foundation for it, it was not based on his personal knowledge, he was not competent
to testify regarding it and his arguments regarding it were speculative, based on hearsay. and
conclusory. R. Vol. II, p. 385.
Thus, the RECORD OF SURVEY was not admissible.

3

The Defendants disagreed with the Plaintiffs; however, rather than merely argue with them.
the Defendants filed the AFFIDAVIT OF KIM LEAVITT, dated June 7, 2011. R. Vol. II, p. 314.
Mr. Leavitt is a professional land surveyor.

He has the education, knowledge, skill,

experience, and training to determine the true and correct boundaries of real property, including,
without limitation, the true and correct location of fences and other improvements thereon.
R. Vol. II, pp. 314-15,

~~

2-5.

Unlike Mr. Manwaring, Mr. Leavitt was competent to testify regarding the true and correct
location of the fence in this case. See I.R.E. 702.
The AFFIDAVIT OF KIM LEA VITT duly evidenced that the fence does not sit on the
Plaintiffs' parcel of real property and it is not off by 15 feet; instead, it sits on the boundary between
the Plaintiffs' parcel of real property and the Defendants' parcel of real property and it marks the
boundary between them.
Thus, the Plaintiffs did not carry their burden of proof on this issue; allegations in pleadings
and arguments of counsel are not sufficient:
... When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the pai1y' s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Ifthe pai1y
does not so respond, summary judgment ... shall be entered against him.
See I.R.C.P. 56(e).
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The trial court agreed:
Pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the RECORD
OF SURVEY, submitted as an exhibit to Plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit, lacks a
proper foundation and is not properly before the court. Therefore, the Plaintiffs have
failed to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
As such, and based on the evidence properlv before the court, it appears that the
fence is the boundarv line between the parcels owned by Plaintiffs and Defendants.
R. Vol. III, p. 606 (emphasis added).
III.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

The "failure" of the Plaintiffs to "set forth specific facts showing that there was a genuine
issue for trial," coupled with the "evidence properly before the court"-that is, the AFFIDAVIT OF
KIM LEA VITT-was decisive.
Therefore, the trial court ruled in favor of the Defendants and entered a JUDGMENT AND
DECREE OF QUIET TITLE on November 3, 2011. R. Vol. IV, p. 608.
Twelve days later, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to
I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B). R. Vol. IV,p. 664.
The trial court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration on December 21, 2011 :
In its October 28, 2011, Opinion and Order, this court found that, "[p )ursuant
to Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Record of Survey submitted
as an exhibit to Plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit lacks a proper foundation and is not
properly before the court." Although Plaintiffs request this court to reconsider its
opinion in light of the new evidence supplied with their motion, there is no new
evidence with their motion. The evidence is the same Record of Survey performed
by Kevin Thompson that was not properly before the court in the previous motions.
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The Plaintiffs have now submitted an Affidavit of Kevin Thompson to lay the proper
foundation for the survey, but the evidence is not new. While Plaintiffs are not
required to present new evidence in a Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) motion for reconsideration,
their motion is based on the court now considering the Record of Survey that was not
properly before the court on the previous motions. This evidence was known to the
Plaintiffs in May of 2011 when they filed for summary judgment and was known to
them when the complaint was filed in this case in June of 2010. Based on Rule 56( c)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and also on the court's Scheduling Order, the
affidavit of Kevin Thompson should have been submitted months ago. Therefore,
as the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests in this court's
discretion, this court finds that it is too late to now submit an affidavit that could
have, and should have, been submitted months ago. To decide otherwise would
essentially allow Plaintiffs to not comply with the rules of civil procedure and the
court's Scheduling Order and roll the dice with a motion for summary judgment. If
they lose on that motion, under the same rules of civil procedure not complied with
originally, they would then be allowed to file endless restructured motions on the
same subject matter.
R. Vol. IV, pp. 772-73.
The Plaintiffs filed a NOTICE OF APPEAL on January 30, 2012. R. Vol. IV, p. 791.
According to the Plaintiffs, the trial court "applied the wrong legal standard" to their motion for
reconsideration. See APPELLANTS' BRIEF, p. 13.
The APPELLANTS' BRIEF and the RESPONDENTS' BRIEF address the foregoing
issue-that is, whether the trial court "applied the wrong legal standard." Thus, the Defendants will
not address the foregoing issue in this brief
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IV.
LEFT HANGING
As previously stated, the cross-motions for summary judgment addressed the following three
issues:
1.

The true and correct location of the fence;

2.

The doctrine of adverse possession;

3.

The doctrine of boundary by agreement or acquiescence.

The trial court duly and properly disposed of the first issue; again, it ruled in favor of the
Defendants and entered a JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF QUIET TITLE on November 3, 2011.
R. Vol. IV, p. 608.
However, the trial court did not dispose of the second and third issues-namely, the doctrines
of adverse possession and boundary by agreement or acquiescence:

... The remaining issues argued bv counsel regarding adverse possession and
boundarv bv acquiescence do not need to be addressed.
R. Vol. III, p. 606 (emphasis added).
In light of the fact that the Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the first
issue, the Defendants filed a cross-motion for reconsideration regarding the second and third issues:
Because of the Plaintiffs' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, the
Defendants hereby move the court to address the "remaining issues"-to wit, the
doctrine of adverse possession and the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
R. Vol. IV, p. 676.
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The trial court duly and properly disposed of the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration: again.
the trial court denied it. R. Vol. IV, p. 771.
However, the trial court did not dispose of the Defendants' cross-motion for reconsideration.
As a result, the second and third issues are still extant. In this regard, please note the following five
points:
1.

The doctrines of adverse possession and boundary by agreement or acquiescence were

duly and properly "framed by the pleadings." R. Vol. I, p. 19, p. 24, p. 26,

il (f),

and p. 27.

~

(h);

see also R. Vol. I, p. 30, ~ 3.
2.

The Plaintiffs specifically and expressly raised the doctrines of adverse possession

and boundary by agreement or acquiescence in their motion for summary judgment. R. Vol. L p. 70
(pp. 75-78).
3.

Tl1e Defendants specifically and expressly raised the doctrines of adverse possession

and boundary by agreement or acqrnescence m their cross-motion for summary judgmenl.
R. Vol. I, p. 143 (pp. 147-160).
4.

The parties filed affidavits, exhibits, and excerpts from the deposition of\!. Leo

Campbell. the Plaintiff in this case, to address the doctrines of adverse possession and boundary by
agreement or acquiescence, and they exhaustively briefed them in their respective memoranda.
5.

Finally, the parties fully and thoroughly argued the doctrines of adverse possession

and boundary by agreement or acquiescence at oral argument.
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court did not dispose of the second and third issues.
The reason is simple, if not mundane: The Plaintiffs 'Zailed to set forth specific [acts showing that

there was a genuine issue for triaf' regarding the first issue-that is, the true and correct location of
the fence. Therefore, "based on the evidence properly before the court"-that is, the AFFIDAVIT
OF KIM LEAVITT, the trial court ruled in favor of the Defendants and entered a JUDGMENT AND
DECREE OF QUIET TITLE on November 3, 2011.
In other words, the trial court did not dispose of the second and third issues because,
in its mind, it did not ''need'' to dispose of them:
. . . The remaining issues argued by counsel regarding adverse possession and
boundary by acquiescence do not need to be addressed.
R. Vol. III, p. 606 (emphasis added).

The first issue, in and of itself, was a sufficient and proper basis for the disposition of this
case.

v.
RIGHT RESULT-WRONG THEORY
The second and third issues are perfect issues for application of the appellate doctrine of
right result-wrong theory:
... [The doctrine ofright result-wrong theory] applies to issues where an alternative
rule oflaw can be applied to a given body of facts, yielding the same legally correct
answer.
Agrodvne. Inc. v. Beard, 114 Idaho 342, 348, 757 P.2d 205, 211 (Idaho App. 1988).
9

Thus, assuming for purposes of argument:
1.

That the trial court "applied the wrong legal standard" to the Plaintiffs' motion for

reconsideration; and/or
2.

That the trial court, for some other unknown reason, should have granted the

Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration:
The second and third issues, or either of them, are still sufficient and proper bases for the
disposition of this case.
In other words, this court does not need to determine whether the trial court "applied the
\Vrong legal standard" to the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration or whether the trial court
for some other unknown reason, should have granted the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
The reason: The trial court got the right result. The doctrines of adverse possession and boundary
by agreement or acquiescence, or either of them, "yield the same legally correct answer."
Again. the doctrines of adverse possession and boundary by agreement or acquiescence were
duly and properly "framed by the pleadings." The Plaintiffs raised them in their motion for summary
judgment. The Defendants raised them in their cross-motion for summary judgment. The parties
filed affidavits, exhibits, and deposition excerpts to address them, they exhaustively briefed
them, and they fully and thoroughly argued them at oral argument.
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The following case supports the application of the doctrine ofright result-wrong theory to
this case. The ruling of the Idaho Supreme Court is right on point:
It is unnecessary to determine whether the Mussells are liable based upon a
breach of their duty under Idaho Code Section 55-310 to provide lateral support
because they are liable for unreasonably interfering with the Irrigation District's
easement. Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory.
this court will affirm the order on the correct theory. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573,
21 P .3d 895 (2001 ). Even if the theory adopted by the district court was erroneous,
the Mussells are liable based upon the theory, alleged by the Irrigation District in
its amended complaint, that the Mussells unreasonably interfered with the Irrigation
District's easement.
Nampa & Meridian Irrirration District v. Mussell, 139 Idaho 28, 33, 72 P.3d 868, 873 (2003)
(emphasis added).
Thus, based on the doctrine of right result-wrong theory, the Defendants respectfully raise
the doctrine of adverse possession and the doctrine of boundary by agreement or acquiescence as
"additional issues presented on appeal" in accordance with I.A.R. 35(b)(4). 1

1

Please note that the doctrine ofright result-wrong theory is consistent with the.first rule of
civil procedure:
... These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.
See I.R.C.P. l(a).
Of course, if this court does not want to apply the doctrine of right result-wrong theory to
dispose of the second and third issues, this court may-indeed, should-remand them to the trial court
in accordance with I.AR. 13.3(a).
11

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Based on the doctrine of right result-wrong theory, 1s the doctrine of adverse

possession a sufficient and proper basis for the disposition of this case?
2.

Based on the doctrine ofright result-wrong theory, is the doctrine of boundary by

agreement or acquiescence a sufficient and proper basis for the disposition of this case?
ADVERSE POSSESSION

Idaho Code Section 5-210 sets f01ih the elements of adverse possession:
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by a person claiming
title not founded upon a written instrument, judgment, or decree, land is deemed to
have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only:
(1)

Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure.

(2)

Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.

Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possession be considered
established under the provisions of any sections of this code [3] unless it shall be
shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period of 20 years
continuously, and [4] the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have paid
all the taxes, state, county, or municipal, which have been levied and assessed upon
such land according to law. Provided, further, that adverse possession shall not be
considered established under the provisions of any sections of this code if
[5] a written instrument has been recorded in the real estate records kept by the
county recorder of the county in which the prope1iy is located and such written
instrument declares that it was not the intent of a party to such instrument, by
permitting possession or occupation of real property, to thereby define property
boundaries or ownership. (Emphasis added.)
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ARGUMENT
I.

NEl/4 OF SECTION 17
As previously stated, the fence nms across the middle of the NEl/4 of Section 17. According
to the Plaintiffs, the fence was there "before the Davises bought the property." R. Vol. IL p. 287
(emphasis added).
Parley Davis and Hannah Davis bought the NEl/4 of Section 17 on March 3, 1919.
R. Vol. I, p. 171, ii 46.

Parley Davis and Hannah Davis have long since passed away. R. Vol. I, p. 166,
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ii 23.

In 1937, Hannah Davis transferred the NEl/4 of Section 17 to Charlotte Campbell. R. Vol. I,
p. 166, ,, 22-23.

Charlotte Campbell was thereafter "in actual possession of, farmed, and paid the taxes on the
above-described property"-that is, the NEl/4 of Section 17. R. Vol. I, p. 166, ii 24.
Charlotte Campbell has also long since passed away. R. Vol. I, p. 167, ii 25.
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In 1950, Charlotte Campbell transferred the Nl /2 of the NE 1/4 to her daughter, Mary Killian,
and the Sl/2 of the NEl/4 to her son, Leo H. Campbell. R. Vol. I, p. 167, i; 26.

Mary Killian thereafter possessed and occupied the Nl/2 of the NEl/4 and Leo H. Campbell
thereafter possessed and occupied the Sl/2 of the NEl/4. R. Vol. I, p. 167, ii 28.
Mary Killian and Leo H. Campbell have also long since passed away. R. Vol. L p. 167, ~ 29.
Leo H. Campbell was the father of V. Leo Campbell, the Plaintiff in this case. R. Vol. L
p. 167, ~ 27.
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In 1981, Leo H. Campbell transferred approximately one acre of the S 1/2 of the NEl/4 to his
son, V. Leo Campbell, the Plaintiff in this case. The Plaintiffs then moved a home onto this acre and
they live there to this day, 31 years later.
In 1989, Leo H. Campbell split the Sl/2 of the NEl/4 into four parcels of real property. He
then transferred one parcel of real property to each of his four children-namely, the Plaintiff
Jo Campbell, Margy Spradling, and Halene Campbell:

Leo H. Campbell transferred the foregoing parcels of real property to his children by DEED
OF GIFT, not by warranty deed. R. Vol. II, p. 236, p. 240, p. 244, and p. 248.

16

In 1996, Halene Campbell passed away. Her estate split her parcel of real property into three
smaller parcels. Her estate then transferred one small parcel to each of her three siblings-namely.
the Plaintiff, Jo Campbell, and Margy Spradling. R. Vol. II, p. 329,

17

~49.

In 2003, the estate of Mary Killian transfened the Nl/2 of the NEl/4 to the Defendants.
R. Vol. I, p. 169, ~ 35.
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Since then-that is, since 2003, the Defendants have possessed and occupied the Nl/2 of the
NEl/4. R. Vol. I, p. 169, ii 36.

II.
ELEMENT NO. 1: "PROTECTED BY A SUBSTANTIAL ENCLOSURE"
The fence was and is a "substantial enclosure."

Again, it has been there since time

immemorial, whether 1919 or "before." In this regard, please note the following:
Before 2003, and going back to at least 1950, 2 the Defendants' predecessor in interest,
Mary Killian, grazed cattle and pastured horses on the north side of the fence. The fence enclosed
and protected the real property on the north side of the fence; for example, it contained the cattle and
horses and stopped them from drifting or straying or roaming at large, including onto the Plaintiffs'
parcel ofreal property. R. Vol. I, p. 173, ii 60( a).
In addition, the Plaintiffs pasture horses on the south side of the fence; so, too, did their
predecessor in interest, Leo H. Campbell. Again, the fence encloses and protects the real property
on the south side of the fence; for example, it contains the Plaintiffs' horses and stops them from
drifting or straying or roaming at large, including onto the Defendants' parcel of real property.
R. Vol. I, p. 173, ii 60(b).
Thus, from at least 1950 to the present, the fence has protected the real property on the both
sides of the fence; and, with specific reference to the north side of the fence, which is the

2

Again, Charlotte Campbell transferred the N 1/2 of the NE 1/4 to her daughter, Mary Killian,
and the S 1/2 of the NE 1/4 to her son, Leo H. Campbell, in 1950.
19

Defendants' side of the fence, the fence has protected the real property by stopping outside cattle and
horses from drifting or straying or roaming at large onto the real property, as well as stopping
trespassers and other third parties from coming onto the real property, including the Plaintiffs and
their horses. R. Vol. I, p. 173,

~

60(c).

The fence is sturdy and strong. It includes metal posts, solid steel T-bars, wooden posts, and
five strands of barbed wire. It is approximately 4.5 feet high and the bottom wire is less than 20
inches above the ground. The posts are less than 24 feet apart, evenly spaced, and solidly set in the
ground. The barbed wire is reasonably tight, well-stretched, and securely fastened to the posts.
R. Vol. I, p. 174,

~

60(e).

Since 2003, the Defendants have personally maintained the fence; so, too, have the Plaintiffs.
In addition, before 2003, and going back to at least 1950, the Defendants' predecessor in interest
maintained the fence; so, too, did the Plaintiffs and their predecessor interest. R. Vol. I, p. 175,
~

60(f}

III.
ELEMENT NO 2: "USUALLY CULTIVATED OR IMPROVED''
The Nl/2 of the NE 114 is not in native condition; it is not high plateau desert or growing
indigenous plants, such as sagebrush and bitter brush. R. Vol. I, p. 175,
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~

61.

The Nl/2 of the NEl/4 has been "usually cultivated or improved" since time immemorial:
for example, it has been farmed, used for pasture, in production, and under irrigation since at least
1937. 3 R. Vol. I, p. 175, ~ 62.
For their part, the Defendants have cultivated or improved it since 2003; in fact, they installed
a pivot on it in 2008, which further improved it. R. Vol. I, p. 175, ii 63.
Before 2003, and going back to at least 1950, the Defendants' predecessor in interest,
Mary Killian, cultivated or improved it. R. Vol. I, p. 175, ~ 64.
Thus, the Nl /2 of the NE 1/4 has been farmed, used for pasture, in production, and under
irrigation since at least 193 7.

IV.
ELEMENT NO. 3: "20 YEARS" OF ADVERSE POSSESSION
As previously stated, Idaho Code Section 5-210 requires 20 years of adverse possession. The
following quote explains this element:

In the case of boundary disputes between contiguous landowners, [a]
landowner [must] establish continuous, open, notorious and hostile possession of an
adjoining strip of his neighbor's land ....
Standall v. Teater, 96 Idaho 152, 156, 525 P.2d 347, 351 (1974); see also Scott v. Gubler, 95 Idaho
441, 511P.2d258 (1973).

3

Again, Hannah Davis transferred the NEl/4 of Section 17 to Charlotte Campbell in 1937.
Charlotte Campbell was thereafter "in actual possession of, farmed, and paid the taxes on the abovedescribed property."
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This case is a "boundary dispute between contiguous landowners."

Again, the north

boundary of the Plaintiffs' parcel is contiguous with the south boundary of the Defendants' parcel.
Since 2003, the Defendants have "possessed an adjoining strip of their neighbor's
land"-specifically, the Defendants have possessed the 15 feet of farm ground that lies north of the
fence that runs between the parties' respective parcels of real property. They have done so
"continuously, openly, notoriously, and hostilely." R. Vol. I, p. 176, if 67.
Before 2003, and going back to at least 1950, the Defendants' predecessor in interesL
Mary Killian, possessed the 15 feet of farm ground that lies north of the fence that runs between the
parties' respective parcels ofreal property. She, too, did so "continuously, openly, notoriously, and
hostilely." R. Vol. I, p. 176, ~· 68.
During his deposition, V. Leo Campbell, the Plaintiff in this case, agreed and candidly
admitted this element:

Q.

On Wednesday, we reviewed the chain of title on this property and
learned that [Delbert H. Killian and Mary C. Killian] received the
deed in 1950 to the north half of the northeast quarter, correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And, again, you don't dispute that they acquired the north half of the
property, do you?

A.

No.

Q.

In terms of a chain of title, we also reviewed a deed to their mother
- well, to Mary's mother, Charlotte, in 1937, correct?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

And, again, you don't dispute that Charlotte acquired the property, all
of the northeast quarter, in 1937, do you?

A.

No.

Q.

Since 2003, you acknowledge and admit that Craig has continuously
occupied the north half of the northeast quarter, don't you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And even with reference to the property north of the fence, you
acknowledge and agree that he has continuously occupied even that
land-

A.

Yes.

Q.

- since 2003, correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You don't allege that Craig has ever abandoned the property, true?

A.

True.

Q.

You don't allege that he's ever vacated the property, true?

A.

True.

Q.

You don't allege that his occupancy has otherwise been interrupted,
there's been no seizure or forfeiture or eviction?

A.

Not to my knowledge, huh-uh.

Q.

With reference to his grantor and predecessor in title, and that is
Delbert Henry Killian and Mary C. Killian, you acknowledge and
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agree that they continuously occupied the north half of the northeast
quarter before Mr. Kvamme, don't you?
A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

And that would also include the ground north of the fence that is in
dispute in this case, correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And, again, you don't allege that they abandoned any of the property?

A.

No.

Q.

You agree that they didn't vacate and their occupancy wasn't
interrupted, true?

A.

True.

Q.

And there's no allegation here that they were evicted or that the
property was seized and taken away from them at any time, correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

With reference to Mr. Kvamme' s use and occupancy since 2003, you
likewise admit that it has been open and plainly visible, correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And that, again, would include all of the ground north of the fence?

A.

Correct.

Q.

In fact, he has installed a pivot, pump, and motor on that ground north
of the fence, hasn't he?

A.

Yes, he has.
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Q.

And, again, that was plainly and openly visible?

A.

Yup.

Q.

And you had knowledge of it and you've known about his open use
since 2003?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And, again, with reference to his predecessors in title, that is Delbert
Henry Killian and Mary C. Killian, again, their occupancy and use of
the property was open and plainly visible?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that would include the land north of the fence that's in dispute
in this case?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you knew about their use and occupancy ofall of the land, didn't
you?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And prior to your coming onto the property in 1981, your father knew
about their use and occupancy of the land north of the fence, didn't
he?

A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

With reference to Craig's use, which, again, began in 2003, you
acknowledge and agree that his occupancy of the property has been
hostile and adverse to you, correct?

Mr. Manwaring: Objection, you can answer.
A.

I don't know that it's been hostile and adverse.
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Q.

Well, with reference to the north half of the northeast quarter, you do
agree that his occupancy of the north half of the northeast quarter has
been against any interest you might have in the property and adverse
to you, correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And that would include all of the land north of the fence that's in
dispute in this case, correct?

Mr. Manwaring: Object to the form. You can answer.
A.

I didn't follow you on that one.

Q.

Well, with reference to all of the ground north of the fence -

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

- Craig has continuously used it.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Continuously occupied it.

A.

Yes.

Q.

You've known about that.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that has been against what you claim is your interest in the
property, true?

Mr. Manwaring: Object to the form. You can answer.
A.

I'm not real sure what you're asking me for here.
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Q.

Well, let me see ifI can break it down a bit into simple parts. You've
acknowledged and agreed that Craig has occupied the property,
including all of the property north of the fence, correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

You've agreed and acknowledged that you knew about his occupancy
of the property, including all of the property north of the fence?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And yet you claim the property north of the fence, to some distance,
is your property?

A.

Correct.

Q.

All right. So you would agree, then, that his occupancy and use of the
property has been hostile to your claimed interest in that property?

Mr. Manwaring: Object to the form. You can answer.
A.

Again, I don't see the hostile.

Q.

Well, it's been adverse to your interest or your claimed interest in that
property. Would you at least agree with that?

Mr. Manwaring: Objection, same. Go ahead.
A.

I really don't know what you want. This is a rather long, convoluted
situation that has developed to this point over the last few years.

Q.

Do you allege or claim that you ever told Mr. Kvamme that you
claimed an interest in the land north of the fence?

A.

I attempted to.
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Q.

Do you allege or claim that you ever told Mr. Kvamme that you claim
an interest in the land north of the fence, yes or no.

A.

No.

Q.

Now, let's go back to this common building block. If you never told
him that you claimed an interest in the land north of the fence, isn't
it equally true that you never gave him permission to use the land
north of the fence?

Mr. Manwaring: Object to the form. Go ahead and answer.
A.

No. I didn't give him permission to use the land.

Q.

Okay. And isn't it also true that you never gave him consent to use
the land north of the fence?

A.

True.

Q.

And you never gave him any other form of authorization to use the
land north of the fence, correct?

Mr. Manwaring: Objection. Go ahead and answer.
A.

No.

Q.

Again, with reference to his predecessor and grantor in title, and that
is Delbert H. Killian and Mary C. Killian, you likewise never granted
permission to them to use and occupy the land north of the fence, did
you?

A.

No.
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Q.

And you never gave them consent to use and occupy the land north
of the fence?

A.

No.

Q.

You never gave them any other form of authorization to use and
occupy the land north of the fence?

A.

No.

Q.

We talked earlier about Mr. Kvamme, and I'll go through the list one
by one, but, again, you never notified him that you claimed an
ownership interest in any of the land north of the fence, did you?

A.

No.

Q.

Have you ever notified Flat Rock Ranches that you claim an
ownership interest in any of the land north of the fence?

A.

No.

Q.

Have you ever notified Flat Rock Ranches that you allege the fence
is not the true and correct boundary between the properties?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever notify Mike Smith?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever notify Mark Berry?

A.

No.
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Q.

Did you ever notify Don Mickelson?

A.

I did tell him that I thought the property line was on the far side of the
fence. 4

Q.

And that conversation is what precipitated his letter to my client right
before this litigation began, correct?

A.

I don't know what that letter was.

Q.

Oh, all right.

A.

So I can't tell you.

Q.

I guess a different point of reference, then, would be that the
conversation with Mr. Mickelson occurred after you got the survey
from Kevin Thompson, correct?

A.

Yes. 5

Q.

All right. Did you ever tell Rowdy Construction or notify them that
you claimed an ownership interest in the property north of the fence?

A.

No.

Q.

Or that, in your allegation in this case, that the fence does not mark
the true and correct boundary between the properties?

A.

No. Never went that far.

4

Don Mickelson is a real estate agent. The Plaintiffs, Jo Campbell, and Margy Spradling
retained his services in 2008 in an attempt to sell the S 1/2 of the NEl/4 to Rowdy Construction.
R. Vol. II, p. 27 4.
5

Kevin L. Thompson finalized the RECORD OF SURVEY on October 5. 2009. R. Vol. L
p. 116; see also, R. Vol. IL p. 346.
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Q.

Have you ever enrolled your property in any governmental programs
such as CRP, Conservation Reserve Program, any program under the
USDA?

A.

My pasture is.

Q.

What program?

A.

I don't remember.

Q.

Any other governmental programs of any kind or nature?

A.

No.

Q.

Do you claim that you have water rights that are appurtenant to your
property?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

Are those through an irrigation company?

A.

Yes, they are.

Q.

Which one?

A.

I'm trying to think of what the canal company is. Drawing a blank.

Q.

Okay. That's fine. With reference to the governmental program in
which you've got your pasture enrolled, did you ever notify that
program that you claimed an interest in any of the land north of the
fence?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever notify that program that you alleged that the fence does
not mark the true and correct boundary between the properties?
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A.

No.

Q.

How about the canal company? Did you ever notify them?

A.

No.

Q.

You acknowledge and admit that you have never enclosed the ground
north of the fence that you allege is your property in this case, don't
you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you likewise agree that you have never cultivated or otherwise
improved that land north of the fence that you claim as your property.
true?

A.

True.

Q.

And you likewise agree that you have never pastured or grazed
livestock on that ground located north of the fence that you allege is
yours, true?

A.

True.

Q.

All right. [Y]ou do acknowledge and admit that Mr. Kvamme and his
predecessors in title have always cultivated and otherwise improved
the land that you claim is your property nmih of the boundary,
correct?

A

Correct.

Q.

You likewise acknowledge and admit that you've never irrigated any
of the land located north of the fence that you claim as your property?

A.

Well, that's debatable, but, okay, I'll agree.

Q.

You've never put that ground located north of the fence in production
for your purposes, have you?

A.

No.

Q.

You also acknowledge and agree that you've never leased any of that
ground located north of the fence to anybody?

A.

I leased it to Mr. Kvamme, I guess. 6

Q.

But you've already acknowledged that you never notified him

A.

No.

Q.

- that you claim that ground was yours

A.

No.

Q.

- correct?

A.

Correct.

6

Again, the Defendants purchased the Nl/2 of the NEl/4 in 2003. Shortly thereafter. the
Defendants rented the S1/2 of the NEl/4 from the Plaintiffs, Margy Spradling, and Jo Campbell.
R. Vol. II, p. 284.
The Defendants farmed the S 1/2 of the NEl/4 lmtil 2008-specifically, until the Plaintiffs,
Margy Spradling, and Jo Campbell "had an opp01iunity to sell the land." Again, Rowdy
Construction made an offer to purchase to them in 2008. R. Vol. II, pp. 273-74.
Before Rowdy Construction made the offer to purchase, however, the Defendants installed
a center irrigation pivot on the Nl/2 of the NEl/4. R. Vol. I, p. 175, ~ 63. The pivot sits on the north
side of the fence. It includes a pump, an underground mainline, a riser, and a concrete anchor pad.
R. Vol. I, p. 174, and Vol. II, pp. 257-64.
The pivot was designed and engineered to cover both the Nl/2 of the NEl and the
S 1/2 of the NEl/4. Again, the Defendants were farming both halves at the time. R. Vol. II, p. 284,
and p. 391.

Q.

All right. And you've never received any rental income from any of
the ground located north of the fence that you claim as your property
in this case, have you.

A.

Nope.

Q.

And you've never received any kind of a share crop for any of the
ground located north of the fence that you claim is your property,
correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

I do understand that you listed your property for sale with
Mr. Mickelson. Did you place a For Sale sign on your property?

A.

I did.

Q.

Did you place a For Sale sign next to the 15 feet of the property that
you claim is your property in this case?

A.

No.

R. Vol. II, pp. 282-95.

v.
ELEMENT NO. 4: "PAID ALL THE TAXES"
As previously stated, Idaho Code Section 5-210 requires the "party or persons, their
predecessors and grantors, to have paid all the taxes upon such land."
Since 2003. the Defendants have "paid all the taxes" that have been "levied and assessed'.
against the Nl/2 of the NEl/4. R. Vol. I, p. 189,

~
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71.

The Plaintiffs agreed:
Q.

You do not dispute or contend in this case that Mr. Kvamme has
failed to pay all of the taxes that have been levied and assessed
against the north half of the northeast quarter, do you?

A.

No.

R. Vol. II, p. 285.
Before 2003, and going back to at least 1950, the Defendants' predecessor in interest,
Mary Killian, "paid all the taxes" that were "levied and assessed" against the Nl/2 of the NEl/4.
R. Vol. I, p. 189,

~

73.

Again, the Plaintiffs agreed:
Q.

And, in fact, you do not contend or allege in this case that his
predecessor and grantor in title, Delbert H. Killian and Mary C.
Killian, did not pay all of the taxes that were levied and assessed
against the n011h half of the northeast quarter, do you?

A.

No, I don't.

R. Vol. II, p. 285.
Thus, the taxes on the Nl/2 of the NEl/4 are current. No taxes are outstanding, past due, or
otherwise in default or arrears. R. Vol. I, p. 189,

~
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76.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Plaintiffs argued that the Defendants have not paid the
taxes on the 15 feet of farm ground that lies north of the fence. Their argument is a clever, albeit
disingenuous hop, skip, andjump:
The hop:

According to the Plaintiffs, the fence is off by 15 feet.

The skip:

Hence, the 15 feet of farm ground that lies north of
the fence is actually part of the Sl/2 of the NEl/4.

The jump:

Hence, Idaho Code Section 5-210 requires the
Defendants to have paid all the taxes on the S 112 of
the NEl/4.

In other words, according to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants have not "paid all the taxes" on
the 15 feet farm ground that lies north of the fence because "such land" is actually part of the
S 1/2 of the NEl/4, not the Nl/2 of the NEl/4. This was their sole argument in opposition to the
doctrine of adverse possession:
... No part of the tax collections received on the assessment of the K vammes' real
property were applied to the Campbells' real property. The Campbells have paid all
taxes assessed on their real property.
R. Vol. I, p. 78.
With all due respect, the Plaintiffs are wrong:
wrong,
wrong,
wrong,
and they are wrong as a matter of law.
36

The following quote explains this element, and it is dispositive of the issue herein:
In the case of boundary disputes between contiguous landowners, where one
landowner can establish continuous open, notorious and hostile possession of an
adjoining strip of bis neighbor's land, and taxes are assessed bv lot number or hv
government survey designation, rather than by metes and bounds description,
payment of taxes on the lot within which the disputed tract is enclosed satisfies the
tax payment requirement of the statute.
Standall v. Teater, 96 Idaho 152, 156, 525 P.2d 347, 351 (1974); see also Scott v. Gubler, 95 Idaho
441, 511P.2d258 (1973) (emphasis added).
The legal description of the Defendants' parcel of real property is the N 1/2 of the NE 1/4.
R. Vol. II, p. 252.

The legal description of their parcel of real property is not a legal description based on metes
and bounds-that is, a legal description based on specific calls of directions and distances from a
stated point of beginning; instead, it is a legal description based on a standard section of land under
the U.S. Public Land Survey System, which nominally contains 640 acres. R. Vol. I, p. 190, ~i

78~

see also R. Vol. II, p. 30L ~ 12 (pp. 297-306, inclusive); and see also R. Vol. IL pp. 307-13.
Thus, "payment of taxes on the lot within which the disputed tract is enclosed satisfies the
tax payment requirement of the statute." See Standall v. Teater, 96 Idaho 152, 156, 525 P.2d 347.
351 (1974). Of course, the "disputed tract" in this case is enclosed"within" the real property that
lies north of the fence, which is the Defendants' parcel of real property.
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VI.
ELEMENT NO. 5: NO "WRITTEN INSTRUMENT HAS BEEN RECORDED"

Finally, the Plaintiffs, including their predecessor in interest, Leo H. Campbell, did not record
a "written instrument" in the records of Bonneville County, Idaho, "declaring that it was not the
intent of the party to such instrument, by permitting possession or occupancy of real property, to
thereby define property boundaries or ownership."
The Plaintiffs agreed:
Q.

And, furthermore, you never recorded a written instrument in the
records of Bonneville County claiming that you had an interest in the
land north of the fence, did you?

A

No.

Q.

Or a written instrument that alleged he was occupying that land with
your permission, did you?

A

No.

Q.

Or a written instrument stating or declaringthat you had an ownership
interest in any of the land north of the fence, did you?

A

No.

Q.

Again, with reference to his predecessor and grantor in title. and that
is Delbert H. Killian and Mary C. Killian, you likewise never granted
permission to them to use and occupy the land north of the fence, did
you?

A.

No.

38

Q.

And, with reference their use and occupancy, again, you never
recorded a written instrument in the records of Bonneville County
stating that they were using it with your permission or that you had an
interest in it or claim ownership in it, did you?

A.

No.

Q.

And, in light of the fact that your interest only began in 1981, your
father likewise never recorded such an instrument, did he?

A.

Not to my knowledge.

R. Vol. II, p. 285.

BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT OR ACQUIESCENCE
The following quote summarizes the elements of boundary by agreement or acquiescence:
Boundary by agreement or acquiescence has two elements: (1) There must
be an unce1iain or disputed boundary, and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the
boundary .... A subsequent agreement may be inferred from the conduct of parties
or their predecessors, including acquiescence to the location and maintenance of a
fence for a long period of time.
Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 860, 230 P.3d 743, 752 (2010) (emphasis added).

ARGUMENT

I.
ELEMENT NO. 1: "UNCERTAIN OR DISPUTED BOUNDARY"
The Defendants farm the Nl/2 of the NEl/4. Nonetheless, they do not know the boundary
between their parcel ofreal property and the Plaintiffs' parcel ofreal property. The Defendants are
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not professional land surveyors. 7 In short, the boundary is "uncertain or disputed." R. Vol. I, p. 192,
ii~

87-89.
Likewise, the Plaintiffs do not know the boundary between the parties' respective parcels of

real property. Once again, the boundary is "uncertain or disputed":
Q.

Of your own personal knowledge, do you know the boundary, the
actual boundary, the true and correct boundary, between the north half
of the northeast quarter and the south half of the northeast quarter of
Section 17?

A.

Not the exact, no.

Q.

And when you say not the exact boundary, no, by that you would also
agree that you're uncertain as to the true and correct boundary
between the north half and the south half of the northeast quarter of
Section 17?

A.

I agree. I would be uncertain, as would everybody else.

Q.

Now, notwithstanding the fact that you are uncertain about that
boundary, your contention in this case is that the boundary is m
dispute, correct?

A.

Correct.

R. Vol. II, p. 286.

7

Again, the Defendants purchased the Nl/2 of the NEl/4 in 2003. They paid good and
valuable consideration for it. They did so upon the belief and understanding that their predecessor
in interest, Mary Killian, had good and marketable title to it; and, with respect to the 15 feet of farm
ground that lies north of the fence, they did so upon the belief and understanding that it was part of
the Nl/2 of the NEl/4. R. Vol. I, p. 191, «ii~ 83-85. Moreover, the Defendants did not have an;
notice, whether actual or constructive, that the Plaintiffs claimed any right, title, or interest in the
15 feet of farm ground that lies north of the fence. R. Vol. I, pp. 191-92, ~ 86.
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II.
ELEMENT NO. 2: "SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT FIXING THE
BOUNDARY, WHICH MAY BE INFERRED FROM THE CONDUCT
OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR PREDECESSORS, INCLUDING
ACQUIESCENCE TO THE LOCATION AND MAINTENANCE
OF A FENCE FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME"
The parties and their predecessors in interest have "acquiesced to the location of the fence
for a long period of time." It has been there since time immemorial, whether 1919 of"be{ore." 8 The
Plaintiffs agreed:

Q.

You would agree with me that the fence has been there for a long
period of time.

A

Correct.

R. Vol. II, p. 289.
In addition, the parties and their predecessors in interest have "maintained of the fence for
a long period of time." Again, the Plaintiffs agreed:
Q.

All right. Now, with reference to maintenance and repair, name for
me every person, to your knowledge, that has ever maintained or
otherwise repaired that fence. And by "that fence," I'm specifically
talking about the fence that runs east and west across the property. I
understand you allege the underlying dirt is yours -

A

Uh-huh.

Q.

but everybody to your knowledge that's maintained or repaired that
fence.

8

Again, according to the Plaintiffs, the fence was there "before the Davises bought the
property." Parley Davis and Hannah Davis bought the NEl/4 of Section 17 onMarc/z 3, 1919.
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A.

Well, there would have been my dad, my brother, Jo, and I, and Kurt
Young and Keith Campbell, my other son. Probably all the Killian
boys and Delbert Killian and Mary Killian.

Q.

Meaning Delbert, Jr.

A.

And Senior.

Q.

Right. That's who I assume you meant when you said Delbert. But
Delbert, and also his son after Delbert, passed away.

A.

Yes. Well

Q.

With reference to

A.

I wouldn't bet Delbert, Jr., was down there working on the fence. He
gained quite a bit of weight and was not into doing much fencing.

Q.

Okay.

A.

That's why my kids wound up over there because they were helping
Aunt Mary.

Q.

With reference to your father, when did he maintain and repair this
fence?

A.

When he lived there.

Q.

That would be between 1950 and when he passed away?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. For purposes of maintaining the fence over that long period of
time, what did he do to maintain it?

I'm sorry, go ahead.
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A.

Replaced posts as needed, and installed wire as needed. He did have
electrical wire at one time on it.

Q.

You previously referenced that sometime in the l 960's?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Anything else?

A.

Not right off the top of my head.

Q.

Did your father ever modify the fence?

A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q.

With reference to the period of time where you have been on this
property - and that would be since 1981, correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

What repairs and maintenance have you performed on this fence?

A.

I've replaced sections of wire. I've replaced posts. Repaired it as
needed. Mr. Kvamme also put some time in on the fence.

R. Vol. II, pp. 281-82.
Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the "conduct of the parties and their predecessors" is
decisive:
On the one hand, the Plaintiffs have never enclosed the 15 feet of farm ground that lies north
of the fence; they have never cultivated it, improved it, used it, irrigated it, or put it in production;
they have never received rental income from it; they have never received a share crop from it; they
have never posted it for sale; and, until this case, they have never claimed, asserted a right to it. or
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even notified a third party that the fence allegedly sits on their parcel of real property and is off by
15 feet.
On the other hand, the Defendants have always enclosed the 15 feet of farm ground that lies
north of the fence; they have always cultivated it, improved it, used it, irrigated it, and put it in
production; and they have now installed a center irrigation pivot, pump, underground mainline, riser,
and concrete anchor pad on it, which further improved it.

CONCLUSION
The doctrine of adverse possession and the doctrine of boundary by agreement or
acquiescence, or either of them, are sufficient and proper bases for the disposition of this case.
Based on the appellate doctrine of right result-wrong theory, this court should affirm the trial court.

COSTS ON APPEAL
The Defendants hereby claim costs on appeal in accordance with I.A.R. 40(a).

ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
The Defendants hereby claim attorney's fees on appeal in accordance with I.A.R. 35(b)(5),
I.A.R. 41 (a), I.A.R. 11.2, and Idaho Code Section 12-121. The trial court did not "apply the wrong
legal standard" to the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
The Plaintiffs' argument, based on one paragraph from oral argument, that the trial court
"incorrectly" applied I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2) and "glossed over" I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B) is frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.
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Dated October 24, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I served a copy of the foregoing CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF on the following people
on October 24, 2012:
Just Law Office
Attn: Charles C. Just and Kipp L. Manwaring
3 8 l Shoup A venue
Idaho Falls. ID 83402
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